“Obush” is a Persian word that, if properly understood, may help explain Hindutva’s phenomenal success as an Indian phenomenon. Japanese scholar Hiroshi Kagaya’s insightful work on the role of Aubash in the Iranian revolution and two of the country’s early political turmoils makes us think about the relevance of Aubash to politics in South Asia and beyond. be done.
For Indians who struggle with Persianized Urdu, the term comes to mind in a 1960s cult film in which Mughal emperor Akbar arrogantly chides his wayward teenage son. “We don’t want to see the day when our beloved Hindustan becomes the plaything of a noble prince.”
The term is more pervasive in Kagaya’s description of Aubash in the Iranian context. Marxist intellectuals may readily identify it with their favorite object of contempt, the lumpen proletariat, but they do not necessarily accept the role that class has played in their own rise and fall. In India, classes were seen en masse switching loyalties from the left to rival groups, mainly the current populist ruling class in West Bengal. Another tranche broke away from the left to support the rise of Hindutva forces in former leftist strongholds.
In modern-day Iran, the obash has a variety of roles, including social, religious, economic and political, Kagaya says. The structure appears to have been cleverly replicated by Indian groups such as the Shiv Sena and the Vajran Dar. Some vigilante groups in Pakistan and Sri Lanka have similar structures. The Obushes display a close relationship with their “mohare” (borough), protect it, manage it, identify themselves with it. In addition, they belong to a traditional Varjishga (sports center) or Zurhane (wrestling club) as a center of physical and mental activity. Obash bosses are usually thought of as master wrestlers who sometimes embody the civic virtues of Javan Mardi, portraying masculinity and chivalry.
Getting the police out of the hands of the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh would force him to auction off the bulldozer at a steep discount.
Promising bravery doesn’t always work for women. It’s hard to overlook Obash’s role in inevitably colluding with the police in the death in custody of an Iranian woman accused of not complying with her hijab. “Educate her daughter. Protect her daughter.” The official slogan is embossed on India’s public transport vehicles. But when the ruling class goes all out to defend its supporters accused of sexually abusing female wrestlers, this message quickly turns into a dirty promise of the patriarchal state. The release of about a dozen convicts imprisoned for rape and murder in a Gujarat pogrom in 2002 reflected another example of authenticity in Javan Mardi’s work.
Economically, Obash rules the underworld. Shiv Senna easily enters the frame. Similarities can be seen with the Japanese yakuza. Often they commit and supervise low-level work. They are recruiting unskilled workers, mostly slum dwellers and rural urban migrants, seeking employment even in illegal labor. In comparison, Prime Minister Modi’s advice to “fry the pakoras” was a sincere option. “In short, underemployed and unemployed slum dwellers need obashes for their daily income… similar to the relationship between yakuza and temporary workers in Japan.”
In politics, Kagaya says the Abasshus are allies of the established government. They are the leaders of mob demonstrations, mostly security organisations, or easily hired by anyone who can afford to sustain them in perpetuity. “This fact suggests that they were a hotbed of violent reactionaries in contemporary Iran, but this may be somewhat recast after considering their role in the Islamic revolution.” Sanjay・The Gandhi phenomenon led to a stable supply of Obushes. Their post-emergency migration to rival political parties was characteristic, seeking stronger patrons.
Professor Christophe Jaffruro has raised questions about whether the Deep State of India had a stake in Hindutva. South Asian political scientists, in a recent analysis in The Indian Express, find that the organizational ties of Hindu nationalism have added additional layers to India’s Deep State by extending its social reach to the district and neighborhood levels. He argued that he may have added Jahrrot suggests a lack of adaptability in India’s Deep State, which, like other nations, is assumed to be a national security-driven state. .
I would like to propose another view put forward by the late Pakistani intellectual Dr. Mubasir Hasan. Dr. Hasan has taken a sharp scrutiny of Indian politics. When he visited Delhi after touring West Bengal and several states controlled by the Bharatiya Janata Party, he told me that once our political parties are in power, they will do so through a coalition of cadres and police. said to keep. Hinduvas are no exception. If executives deprive the police of the support they need to inflict pain and exploitation on their chosen targets at any moment, perhaps their undulating muscles will suddenly contract. The changing of the guard in Karnataka, which removes Hindutva’s rule, is a good example to illustrate Dr. Hassan’s view. As for the Deep State, it is perhaps too hampered by upper caste restrictions to have much say in controlling the political choices the country seeks.
Getting the police out of the hands of the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh would force him to auction off the bulldozer at a steep discount. Remember when the opposition was in power in the state? MP Yogi Adityanat was yelling at Lok Sabha. The saffron-clad politician would not have stopped crying if it hadn’t been for the assurances of communist Speaker Somnath Chatterjee’s safety. Gujarat in 2002 and Delhi in 1984, which sparked widespread violence against Muslims or pogroms against Sikhs, would not have been possible without the coordination of the police and India’s Aubash. Both change their tune in response to changing political winds.
The author is Correspondent Dawn in Delhi.
Posted at Dawn on June 13, 2023
